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THE FAIRNESS REQUIREMENT FOR A WORKERS'
COMPENSATION AGREEMENT-THE EFFECT OF
Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders
I. INTRODUCTION
North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act' ("Act") was
enacted to provide immediate certain recovery to victims of indus-
trial accidents, while limiting the employer's liability for such
accidents.2 The philosophy supporting the Act is the wear and
tear of human beings should be charged to industry, just as the
wear and tear of machinery is charged. 3 "The primary purpose of
legislation of this kind[, therefore,] is to compel industr[ies] to
take care of ... [their] own wreckage."4
Subject to the approval of the Industrial Commission, the Act
allows employers and employees to come to a voluntary agreement
as to the compensation due the employee.' The Act requires the
Commission to review all such agreements for compliance with
the statute;6 an underlying principle of these reviews is the stat-
ute represents the General Assembly's determination of what is
fair compensation for a claimant.'
In the recent case of Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders,8 the
North Carolina Supreme Court decided that before the Industrial
Commission may give its approval to an agreement, the Commis-
sion must make a full investigation and determination of the fair-
ness of the compensation agreement to the employee and whether
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 to § 97-143 (1993).
2. Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 190, 345 S.E.2d 374, 381
(1986).
3. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. N.C. Ind. Comm'n, 336 N.C. 200,
203, 443 S.E. 2d 716, 717 (1994) (While compensation is charged to the industry,
eventually it becomes part of the cost of the industrial product to be paid for by
the general public patronizing such products.). See also Cates v. Hunt Constr.
Co., 267 N.C. 560, 148 S.E.2d 604 (1966).
4. Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1991).
6. Id. Once the Commission approves such an agreement, it becomes
binding upon the parties and neither party can later deny the truth of the
matters set forth in the agreement.
7. Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co., 318 N.C. 89, 97-98, 348 S.E.2d 336,
341 (1986).
8. 336 N.C. 425, 444 S.E.2d 191 (1994).
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the agreement is in accord with the intent and purpose of the Act.9
Prior to the Vernon decision, however, the Commission merely
reviewed compensation agreements for completeness and compli-
ance with the Act. 10
This Note provides a history of North Carolina courts' treat-
ment of voluntary settlement agreements prior to Vernon v.
Steven L. Mabe Builders. Next, this Note examines the ruling in
Vernon, as well as the court's reasoning. The Note then reviews
the relevant provisions of the Workers' Compensation Reform Act
of 1994 passed by the General Assembly in July, 1994. Finally,
the Note addresses the ramifications of the Vernon decision and
concludes with a discussion of the decision's effects and the ques-
tions it raises.
II. THE CASE
On October 16, 1986, the plaintiff, Homer R. Vernon, injured
his back while lifting a heavy, solid-core door in the course of
employment as a carpenter's helper with Steven L. Mabe Build-
ers.1 The defendants admitted liability and, pursuant to an
"Agreement for Compensation for Disability" (also known as
Industrial Commission Form 21), began paying Mr. Vernon com-
pensation for his injury. 12 The Form 21 agreement was approved
by the Industrial Commission on January 19, 1987.11
Mr. Vernon reached maximum medical improvement on
August 13, 1987, and was given a fifteen percent permanent par-
tial disability rating by Dr. David L. Kelly. 4 Dr. Kelly's report
also stated he did not think that Mr. Vernon would be able to
return to work. 15
On August 24, 1987, the plaintiff signed a "Supplemental
Memorandum of Agreement As To Payment of Compensation,"
9. Id. at 432, 444 S.E.2d at 191.
10. See Workers' Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n,
Rule 501(4) (West 1995).
11. Id. at 427, 444 S.E. 2d at 193.
12. Id. This agreement paid Mr. Vernon for his temporary total disability
during the healing period of his back pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1991).
13. Id.
14. Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, 110 N.C. App. 552, 553, 430 S.E.2d
676, 677 (1993).
15. Id.
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otherwise known as Industrial Commission Form 26.16 Mr.
Vernon, who is illiterate,' 7 was not represepted at the time that
he signed the Form 26.18 The executed agreement was sent to the
Industrial Commission with Dr. Kelly's office note. 19
The Industrial Commission approved the compensation
agreement on September 4, 1987.20 Defendants paid plaintiff per-
manent partial disability benefits for a period of forty-five weeks
ending on May 27, 1988.21
On September 7, 1989, Mr. Vernon sought to have the Form
26 Agreement set aside so he could pursue a claim for total and
permanent disability.22 In his request for a hearing, Mr. Vernon
stated he had suffered a substantial change in his condition 23 and
16. Id. This agreement provided for compensation for Mr. Vernon's fifteen
percent permanent partial disability in accordance with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
31(23) (1992).
17. Mr. Vernon's wife read the agreement to him before he signed it.
Although Mr. Vernon did not understand what the rating was about, he made no
effort to learn anything more. He did not call an attorney, the insurance
adjuster, or the Industrial Commission before he signed the agreement. Vernon,
110 N.C. App. at 554, 430 S.E.2d at 678.
18. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 428, 444 S.E.2d at 194.
19. Id. at 434, 444 S.E.2d at 200. The Rules of the Industrial Commission
only require that such agreements for compensation be submitted on the proper
Industrial Commission forms, along with all the relevant medical reports. See
Workers' Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n, Rule 501(4)
(West 1995).
20. Vernon, 110 N.C. App. at 554, 430 S.E.2d at 677.
21. Id.
22. Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders, Opinion and Award by Morgan S.
Chapman at 4, I.C. No. 701410, (Sept. 21, 1990). After all of the compensation
under the agreement had been paid, Mr. Vernon went to the social security office
to seek benefits, where someone recommended he see an attorney regarding his
worker's compensation benefits. Upon advice of counsel, he moved to have the
Form 26 set aside. Id.
23. Section 97-47 allows the Commission to review any award on the grounds
of a change in condition. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-47 (1991). After such a review, the
Commission may make an award which increases, decreases, or ends the
compensation previously awarded. Id. Commissioner Chapman's Opinion and
Award did not address the change of condition issue, apparently because it was
not addressed at the hearing. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief to the Court of Appeals
at 2, Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, 110 N.C. App. 552, 430 S.E.2d 676
(1993) (No. 9210IC551).
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he had signed the Form 26 agreement "under duress, undue influ-
ence, fraud, misrepresentation or mutual mistake."24
Deputy Commissioner Chapman found there had been no
fraud, duress, undue influence, misrepresentation or mutual mis-
take in the making of the agreement.25 The Deputy Commis-
sioner also found as a fact that Mr. Vernon did not understand
what the defendant's employees had told him with regards to his
disability.26 The Deputy Commissioner concluded Mr. Vernon
could not claim he had relied on what the defendant's employees
had told him when he signed the agreement, if he did not under-
stand what they were telling him. Thus there could have been
no misrepresentation.28
In addition, the Deputy Commissioner found as a fact that
Mr. Vernon had been free to make an election of remedies. 29 The
Commission would approve the resulting settlement (and the elec-
tion of either remedy) as long as there was supporting documenta-
tion and the agreement complied with the Industrial Commission
Rules and the Act.3 °
The Deputy Commissioner concluded as a matter of law that
Mr. Vernon was not entitled to have the Form 26 agreement set
aside, particularly since there had been no showing of error due to
24. Record on Appeal at 3, Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, 110 N.C. App.
552, 430 S.E.2d 676 (1993). For the text of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1991), see
infra note 25.
25. Id. Section 97-17 sets forth the conditions under which the Commission
may set aside settlement agreements. The statute provides in pertinent part:
[No party to any agreement for compensation approved by the
Industrial Commission shall [thereafter] be heard to deny the truth of
the matters therein set forth, unless it shall be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the Commission that there has been error due to fraud,
misrepresentation, undue influence, or mutual mistake, in which event
the Industrial Commission may set aside such agreement.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1991). The issue of whether Mr. Vernon had sustained
a change in condition was not heard at the hearing. Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe
Builders, Opinion and Award by Morgan S. Chapman at 6, I.C. No. 701410 (Sept.
21, 1990).
26. The plaintiff claimed that the rehabilitation nurse hired by the defendant
led Mr. Vernon to believe he was being awarded the highest possible amount for
his injury. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 5-6, Vernon (No. 9210IC551).
27. Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders, Opinion and Award by Morgan S.
Chapman at 4, I.C. No. 701410, (Sept. 21, 1990).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 5-6.
524 [Vol. 17:521
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fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence. 31 The Deputy Com-
missioner, therefore, found the Industrial, Commission had not
erred in approving the Form 26 agreement. 32 The Full Commis-
sion approved and adopted the decision of Deputy Commissioner
Chapman.33 Mr. Vernon appealed to the court of appeals.34
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Industrial Commission on two grounds: first, there was com-
petent evidence in the record to support the Commission's finding
the agreement was not entered into by reason of misrepresenta-
tion and mutual mistake; and second, there is no requirement
that the Industrial Commission determine a compensation agree-
ment is fair.35
Judge Wynn dissented, asserting the Commission does have a
duty to determine that compensation agreements are fair.36 Since
the Commission had not made a finding that the compensation
agreement was fair, Judge Wynn argued the case should be
remanded for such a determination. 37 Mr. Vernon filed a notice of
appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30,3" and the North Carolina
Supreme Court granted discretionary review on an additional
issue.3 s
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with
Judge Wynn and reversed the court of appeals, remanding to the
Industrial Commission for a determination as to whether the
31. Id. at 6. See also supra note 25.
32. Vernon, Award and Opinion of Morgan S. Chapman at 6, I.C. No. 701410,
(Sept. 21, 1990).
33. Vernon, 110 N.C.App. at 555, 430 S.E.2d at 678.
34. Either party to the dispute may appeal to the court of appeals within
thirty days of the date of the decision of the Industrial Commission. See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 97-86 (Supp. 1994).
35. Vernon, 110 N.C. App. at 558-59, 430 S.E.2d at 680.
36. Id. at 559, 430 S.E.2d at 681.
37. Id. at 560, 430 S.E.2d at 681.
38. Section 7A-30 allows an appeal of right to the North Carolina Supreme
Court where there has been a dissenting opinion in the court of appeals. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (1989).
39. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 435, 444 S.E.2d at 196. The additional issue was
"[Whether] the Form 26 Agreement [should] be set aside on the basis of mutual
mistake, misrepresentation, or excusable neglect, when at the time the
Agreement was executed both parties, and the Industrial Commission,
mistakenly thought that the agreement provided plaintiff all the benefits to
which he was entitled?" Notice of Appeal and Petition for Discretionary Review,
Filed July 12, 1993. The supreme court later determined that the petition for
discretionary review of this issue was improvidently allowed. Vernon, 336 N.C.
at 435, 444 S.E.2d at 196.
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Form 26 Agreement was "fair and just and in accord with the
intent and purpose of the Act, considering plaintiff's entitlement
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-29. "4o The court, however, did not
address the issue of whether the agreement could be put aside
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17.41
The supreme court held the Commission has a duty to deter-
mine that voluntary compensation agreements are fair, and the
Commission had not made such a determination in this case.4 2
The Commission may rescind its approval and put aside the
agreement if it finds the agreement was not fair in light of Mr.
Vernon's potential benefits under section 97-29. 4"
In dissent, Justice Meyer disagreed with the majority's con-
tention that there is a duty for the Industrial Commission to go
beyond finding the terms of the compensation agreement conform
to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.4 4 In Justice
Meyer's view, the procedures followed by the Commission in this
case were sufficient to meet its obligation under the statute.4 5 The
fact that Mr. Vernon may have been eligible for a more favorable
decision does not make the settlement he chose per se unfair.
4 6 If
an agreement complies with the statute, then it is fair by legisla-
tive determination.;47
III. BACKGROUND
A. Structure and Duties of the North Carolina Industrial
Commission
The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act was enacted
for two social policy reasons. First, the Act provides employees
with quick and certain recovery for injuries which arise out of the
course of their employment. 48 Second, the Act allows limited lia-
bility for employers.49 Although the Act is to be liberally con-
40. Id. at 434, 444 S.E.2d at 196.
41. Id. See also supra notes 25 and 39.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 437, 444 S.E.2d at 203 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 438, 444 S.E.2d at 204.
48. Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 345 S.E.2d 374 (1986); see
also Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 712, 325 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1985);
Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966).
49. Hendrix, 317 N.C. at 190, 345 S.E.2d at 381.
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strued in favor of recovery for employees, the courts cannot
judicially expand an employer's liability beyond the statutory
parameters.5 °
The Industrial Commission is the administrative agency
charged with administering the Workers' Compensation Act.51
The Industrial Commission is responsible for assuring fair dealing
and compliance with the Act in any voluntary settlement agree-
ment between the parties.5 2 The Commission acts in a judicial
capacity in those situations where the parties cannot come to a
voluntary agreement. 3
When an employer and an employee agree on a compensation
amount the Commission must approve the agreement before such
an agreement can be enforced.54 This approval requirement is
intended to protect employees against the disadvantages arising
from their economic status and to assure that voluntary compen-
sation agreements are in accord with the Act's intent and pur-
pose.55 In approving compensation agreements, the Commission
acts in a judicial capacity.56 The agreement, when approved,
becomes an award enforceable by a court decree.57
In contrast, under the Industrial Commission Rules,5 8 com-
promise settlements and releases 59 are approved only after a full
investigation and determination that the settlement is fair.6" Vol-
untary compensation agreements are reviewed only to determine
50. Id.
51. Biddix v. Rex Mills, 237 N.C. 660, 662, 75 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1953).
52. Id. See also N.C. GEN STAT. § 97-82 (Supp. 1994).
53. Biddix, 237 N.C. at 663, 75 S.E.2d at 780.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (Supp. 1994).
55. Biddix, 237 N.C. at 663, 75 S.E.2d at 780.
56. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 434, 444 S.E.2d at 200.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-87 (1991); see also Tucker v. Loudermilk, 233 N.C.
185, 188, 63 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1951).
58. The Commission possesses the power to make all rules necessary to
effectuate the Act's intent. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-80 (Supp. 1994).
59. These agreements are also known as "clinchers" which remove the claim
completely from the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction. Vernon, 336 N.C. at
430, 444 S.E.2d at 196.
60. See Workers' Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n,
Rule 502 (West 1995). Compromise agreements are reviewed under Industrial
Commission Rule 502, while compensation agreements are reviewed under
Industrial Commission Rule 501. A similar distinction between settlement
agreements and compensation agreements is made in the statute, in that section
97-17 covers both compromise settlements and compensation agreements while
section 97-82 covers only compensation agreements.
1995] 527
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the required documentation is present and the agreement com-
plies with the provisions of the Act.6'
As in any judicial proceeding, the facts upon which the Com-
mission makes its decisions must be found in the admissions made
by the parties, stipulations entered, and other evidence offered by
the parties.62 "Recourse may not be had to records, files, evidence
or data not thus presented to the court for consideration." 63 In
other words, when making a judicial determination as to whether
a compensation agreement is fair, the Commission may only
review the evidence which is submitted to it. 64 Vernon makes
clear that the Commission must engage in a substantive review
and must analyze those records to determine whether the
employee may recover under more than one provision of the Act.65
When the Workmen's Compensation statute was enacted in
1929,66 the Industrial Commission did not have the power to set
aside agreements.6 7 In response to a decision of the North Caro-
61. See Workers Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n,
Rule 501 (West 1995).
62. Biddix, 237 N.C. at 663, 75 S.E.2d at 780.
63. Id.
64. Under Industrial Commission Rules, the only items which must be
submitted are the Industrial Commission forms and complete medical reports.
See Workers' Compensation Rules of the North Carolina Indus. Comm'n, Rule
501 (West 1995).
65. This substantive review will be important especially when the claimant is
unrepresented and has the option of recovering under more than one statute.
Under Vernon the Commission must determine whether the agreement was the
best option for the employee. In addition, the Commission may have to require
the claimant to retain counsel, as Justice Meyer suggested in his dissent. See
Vernon, 336 N.C. at 438, 444 S.E.2d at 203. In the instant case, Dr. Kelly's note
which mentioned the possibility of permanent total disability was included in the
records sent to the Commission, which could arguably have given the
Commission reason not to approve the agreement.
66. North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. SEss.
LAws 117 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 to § 97-143 (1991 & Supp.
1994)).
67. The statute which was the predecessor to section 97-17 was ch. 120 section
18, which stated:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to prevent
settlements made by and between the employee and employer so long as
the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment are in
accordance with the provisions of this act. A copy of such settlement
agreement shall be filed by employer with and approved by the
Industrial Commission.
North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120 § 18, 1929 N.C. SEss.
LAws 117, 124 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1991)).
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lina Supreme Court68 the General Assembly amended the Act in
1963, specifically giving the Commission such authority.69 The
Industrial Commission presently possesses the power, upon appli-
cation in due time, to relieve a party from a judicial determination
of his rights when the decision is the product of mistake, fraud,
misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake. 70  The
Commission is not a court of general jurisdiction, and its power to
set aside an agreement is no greater than the power granted to it
by statute.71 With its decision in Vernon, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has expanded the judicial powers of the Commis-
sion beyond those granted by statute.72 The Commission may now
set aside an agreement for those reasons listed in section 97-17
and may also set aside agreements which do not provide the plain-
tiff with his maximum potential recovery.
B. The Development of "Scheduled" Injuries
1. Wage Loss verses Schedule Injury Theories
Workers' compensation laws were first enacted in Prussia in
the 1880's.73 Between 1887 and 1907, compensation statutes were
enacted in twenty additional countries.74 These statutes were all
pure wage-loss statutes, and did not contain any provision for any
type of schedule for permanent partial disability. 75 A schedule is
a statutory provision which contains descriptions of various body
68. See Caudill v. Chatham Mfg. Co., 258 N.C. 99, 128 S.E.2d 128 (1962). In
Caudill, the supreme court opined:
[We make no decision with respect to, the question as to whether...
the Industrial Commission has inherent equitable jurisdiction to rescind
and set aside settlements and compromise settlements, approved by
them on the ground of mutual mistake of fact.... The General Assembly
may desire to give the matter consideration. If the Industrial
Commission presently has no such jurisdiction by implication, it cannot
confer such jurisdiction upon itself in the exercise of its rule making
authority.
Id. at 106-07, 128 S.E.2d at 133 (emphasis added).
69. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1991).
70. Id.; accord Stanley v. Brown, 261 N.C. 243, 134 S.E.2d 321 (1964).
71. See Hartsell v. Pickett Cotton Mills, 4 N.C. App. 67, 165 S.E.2d 792
(1969).
72. These powers are essentially equitable powers, which allow the
Commission to set aside agreements on equitable grounds of unfairness.
73. 1C LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.14(b) (1992).
74. Id.
75. Id. A pure wage-loss statute merely compares the pre-injury earnings of
the employee with the post-injury earnings and compensates the employee for
1995] 529
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parts and provides specific compensation rates for loss of those
body parts.
The first workers' compensation acts passed in the United
States were mostly pure wage-loss statutes.76 The first schedules
which appeared were those contained in individual insurance poli-
cies, which began to appear in the second half of the nineteenth
century.77 Schedules, limited to obvious and easily provable
losses, were never intended to depart from the wage-loss con-
cept.78 Schedules were enacted with the goal of preventing litiga-
tion and providing certainty of recovery for those who had
sustained a scheduled loss. 79 A presumption existed, which was
more valid in the early 1900's than today, that there would be a
reduction in earning capacity if a worker lost one of the scheduled
members.8 0
Schedules began to proliferate and expand in the early
1900's. s ' This expansion covered more types of recovery, depart-
ing from compensation only for larger bodily members to smaller
members.8s Loss of use became compensable, as well as actual
loss of a limb and partial loss of use of a limb.8 3 The more the
schedules expanded, the less they reflected the true wage-loss
principle which the compensation acts were based upon.
2. Workmen's Compensation Laws in North Carolina
The North Carolina Workers' Compensation statute was first
enacted in 1929 and included a limited schedule of injuries. 4 The
purpose of the schedule provision was, and is, to provide swift and
the loss in wages. No such pure wage-loss statutes exist in the United States
today. Id.
76. Id. By the end of 1911, of the ten compensation statutes enacted in
America, all but two were the pure wage-loss type.
77. Id.
78. LARSON, supra note 73, at § 57.14(c).
79. Id. (citing Professor Francis H. Bohlen, Duke Univ. Law Library
Pamphlets).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. LARSON, supra note 73, at § 57.14(d).
83. Id.
84. North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120 § 31, 1929 N.C.
SESS. LAws 117, 130 (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31). The statute as
originally enacted did not contain provisions for recovery for loss of use of the
back, or loss of "any important external or internal organ" that are currently in
the Act. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1991).
530 [Vol. 17:521
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certain compensation to an injured employee and to allow limited
and determinate liability for employers.8 5
The North Carolina Supreme Court historically interpreted
the Act liberally in favor of benefits for employees.86 As first
enacted, the North Carolina workers' compensation law allowed
for four types of compensation to be paid to employees.8 7 The
North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted these compensation
allowances to be non-exclusive, 8 and allowed awards for sched-
uled injuries even where the employee had not suffered any loss of
wages or earning capacity.8 9 Thus, an employee who had suffered
no actual economic injury in the form of lost wages could receive
payment for a scheduled injury.
The North Carolina General Assembly reacted to this judicial
interpretation by modifying the law in 1943 to prohibit double
compensation by adding the "in lieu of" language found in section
97-31.90 Although the modified statute provided recovery for
scheduled injuries was to be "in lieu of all other compensation," 91
the North Carolina Supreme Court determined that such lan-
guage did not prohibit recovery for the loss of an organ and the
disfigurement which resulted from its removal.92 The court rea-
85. See Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484
(1966).
86. See Reeves v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 199 N.C. 236, 154 S.E. 66
(1930); Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 153 S.E. 591 (1930);
Roberts v. City Ice & Coal Co., 210 N.C. 17, 185 S.E. 438 (1936); Barbour v. State
Hosp., 213 N.C. 515, 196 S.E. 812 (1938); Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290
N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976).
87. The types of compensation allowed were: (1) Compensation for disability
(Disability, for purposes of the Act, is defined as incapacity to earn the wages
which the employee was receiving at the time of the accident.); (2) Compensation
in stipulated amounts for loss of some body part (Scheduled injuries); (3)
Compensation for death; (4) Compensation for disfigurement. North Carolina
Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120 § 31, 1929 N.C. SESS. LAws 117, 130
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-131 (1991)).
88. See Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 25 S.E.2d 865
(1943).
89. See Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 222 N.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 570 (1942).
90. Section 97-31 reads in pertinent part: "In cases included by the following
schedule the compensation in each case shall be paid for disability during the
healing period and in addition the disability shall be deemed to continue for the
period specified, and shall be in lieu of all other compensation, including
disfigurement." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31 (1991) (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. See Cates v. Hunt Constr., 267 N.C. 560, 148 S.E.2d 604 (1966). In Cates,
the worker had sustained an injury which resulted in his loss of a kidney. The
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soned the "in lieu of" provisions apply only when all of the
employee's injuries, are: set out in the schedule.93
The next question that arose concerning the scheduled injury
provisions was whether an employee could recover for permanent
total or partial disability94 when all of the injuries which cause the
disability are scheduled injuries.95 When the North Carolina
Supreme Court first addressed this question in 1942, it deter-
mined that recovery under section 97-31 was exclusive in the case
of total disability, which meant no recovery under the scheduled
injury statute.96 If an employee is only partially disabled as a
result of a scheduled injury, however, the employee can recover for
both the partial disability and the scheduled injury.97
The court later determined an employee may recover for
either total disability or for the scheduled injury, overruling its
previous determination that recovery under the scheduled injury
provision was exclusive.98 The employee is free to elect compensa-
tion under whichever provision is more favorable. 99
C. Judicial Interpretation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-17 and § 97-
82
North Carolina General Statute § 97-17 gives the Industrial
Commission the power to set aside agreements that it finds to be
Industrial Commission awarded compensation for disfigurement due to the scar
that was left when the kidney was removed, but not for loss of the kidney
because it was not a scheduled loss. The disfigurement caused by the scar,
however, was included on the schedule of injuries. The supreme court reversed,
holding the loss of the kidney was compensable notwithstanding the "in lieu of"
language of the statute. See also supra note 65.
93. Hill v. Hanes Corp., 319 N.C. 167, 175, 353 S.E.2d 392, 397 (1987).
94. Disability is defined as "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages
which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or other
employment." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(9) (Supp. 1994).
95. Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 222 N.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 570 (1942).
96. Id.
97. Fleming v. K-Mart Corp., 312 N.C. 538, 545, 324 S.E.2d 214, 218 (1985).
98. See Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg. Co., 318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E.2d 336
(1986).
99. Id. See generally J. Cameron Furr, Survey of Developments in North
Carolina Law: XIII. Workers' Compensation: Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Mfg.
Co.: Abolishing the Exclusive Remedy Requirement for the Scheduled Injuries
Section of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, 66 N.C. L. REv. 1365
(1988); John David Mayberry, Note, Workers' Compensation: North Carolina
General Statutes Section 97-31: Must It Provide Exclusive Compensation For
Workers Who Suffer Scheduled Iruries?, 62 N.C. L. Rav. 1462 (1984).
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erroneous "due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or
mutual mistake."100 North Carolina General Statute § 97-82
allows the parties to reach an agreement with regards to compen-
sation, as long as the employer files the agreement with the Indus-
trial Commission and the Commission approves the agreement. 10 1
If an agreement is reached, but is not filed with and approved by
the Commission, it is voidable at the option of the employee or his
dependents.10 2 Once an agreement is approved it is enforceable
by a court decree.
10 3
D. Case Law Concerning the Judicial Power of the Industrial
Commission
The North Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the ques-
tion of the limits of the Industrial Commission's judicial capacity
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1991). See also supra note 25.
101. The statute reads as follows:
Memorandum of agreement between employer and employee to be
submitted to Commission on prescribed forms for approval; direct
payment as award
(a) If the employer and the injured employee or his dependents reach an
agreement in regard to compensation under this Article, they may enter
into a memorandum of the agreement in the form prescribed by the
Commission.
An agreement, however, shall be incorporated into a memorandum
of agreement in regard to compensation: (i) for loss or permanent injury,
disfigurement, or permanent and total disability under G.S. 97-31, (ii)
for death from a compensable injury or occupational disease under G.S.
97-38, or (iii) when compensation under this Article is paid or payable to
an employee who is incompetent or under 18 years of age.
The memorandum of agreement, accopanied by a full and complete
medical report, shall be filed with and approved by the Comission;
othewise such agreement shall be voidable by the employee or his
dependents.
(b) If approved by the Commission, a memorandum of agreement
shall for all purposes be enforceable by the court's decree as hereinafter
specified. Payment pursuant to G.S. 97-18(b), or payment pursuant to
G.S. 97-18(d) when compensability and liability are not contested prior
to expiration of the period for payment without prejudice, shall
constitute an award of the Commission on the question of
compensability of and the insurer's liability for the injury for which
payment was made. Compensation paid in these circumstances shall
constitute payment of compensation pursuant to an award under this
Article.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (Supp. 1994).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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in the case of Biddix v. Rex Mills. 0 4 Biddix involved an employee
who filed a claim and request for hearing more than a year after
the accident in which his injury occurred.'0 . The Deputy Commis-
sioner denied the claim, determining that it was barred by section
97-24.106 The Full Commission reversed, finding the employer
had "lulled" the employee into a false sense of security, and there-
fore was estopped from pleading section 97-24.107 The North Car-
olina Supreme Court reversed the Full Commission and
reinstated the decision of the Deputy Commissioner.10 8
The supreme court in Biddix found the Full Commission had
erred in waiving the statute of limitations imposed by section 97-
24.109 When an employer does what he is required to'do, which in
this case was to provide medical care to the injured employee, the
employer does not waive the protective provisions of the statute
enacted in his behalf.110 Since the employee had not filed his
claim within twelve months of the accident, as required by section
97-24,111 he was barred from recovery.1 12 The court held the Com-
mission may not waive statutory provisions on equitable
grounds. 1 13
In Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co., 114 the supreme court
refused to release the parties from an approved Form 26.1'5 When
the plaintiff signed the agreement he was unrepresented by coun-
104. 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777 (1953). Section 97-24 provides that the right
to compensation is barred unless a claim is filed with the Industrial Commission
within two years of the accident. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24 (Supp. 1994). At the
time Biddix was decided, the statute of repose was one year.
105. Biddix, 237 N.C. at 662, 75 S.E.2d at 779.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 666, 75 S.E.2d at 782. This case was decided before the court of
appeals was created in 1968.
109. Id. at 664, 75 S.E.2d at 780.
110. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (1991).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-24 was amended in 1955 to extend the time limit for
filing from one year to two years. See generally McCrater v. Stone & Webster
Eng'g Corp., 248 N.C. 707, 104 S.E.2d 858 (1958) (holding the plaintiff's
substantive right of recovery could not be enlarged by a subsequent statute
extending the requisite time limit).
112. Biddix, 237 N.C. at 666, 75 S.E.2d at 782.
113. Id. It should be noted, however, that the Biddix holding was limited only
to the facts contained in the case; it may be concluded, therefore, that waiver is
possible in the appropriate circumstances. See Biddix, 237 N.C. at 665, 75
S.E.2d at 781.
114. 289 N.C. 254, 221 S.E.2d 355 (1976).
115. Id. at 260, 221 S.E.2d at 359.
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sel, both parties were mistaken about the meaning of the medical
reports, and the plaintiff was subsequently, totally unable to work
at his trade. 116 The supreme court found there was no evidence in
the record that specifically supported an allegation of fraud, mis-
representation, undue influence or mutual mistake. 117 None of
the reasons given by the plaintiff fell within section 97-17 param-
eters set out by the legislature. 118 The parties, therefore, would
be bound by the agreement unless, and until, the Commission
could find the agreement was in error for one of the section 97-17
reasons. 119
Several North Carolina Court of Appeals cases followed the
Pruitt standard. 120 One case is particularly relevant; Brookover v.
Borden, Inc. 121 In Borden, the plaintiff, a milk deliveryman, suf-
fered a compensable back injury. 122 He was rated as having a ten
percent permanent partial disability of the back. 123 He signed a
Form 26 agreement which compensated him under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-31.124 He later sought to set the agreement aside in
order to seek benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-30.125 His
request to have the agreement set aside was denied by the Deputy
Commissioner, and the Full Commission affirmed. 126
The plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals. 127 He had been
unrepresented by counsel when he signed the agreement, and the
defendant had failed to explain to him he had the right to elect
benefits under another provision of the Act. The plaintiff argued
to the court of appeals that he was unable to make an "informed
116. Id. at 259, 221 S.E.2d at 359.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 260, 221 S.E.2d at 359.
120. See Buchanan v. Mitchell County, 38 N.C. App. 596, 248 S.E.2d 399
(1978), cert. denied, 296 N.C. 583, 254 S.E.2d 35 (1979); Roberts v. Carolina
Tables of Hickory, 76 N.C. App. 148, 331 S.E.2d 757 (1985); Mullinax v.
Fieldcrest Cannon, 100 N.C. App. 248, 395 S.E.2d 160 (1990).
121. 100 N.C. App. 754, 398 S.E.2d 604 (1990), review denied, 328 N.C. 270,
400 S.E.2d 450 (1991).
122. Id. at 754, 398 S.E.2d at 605.
123. Id
124. Id.
125. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-30 (1991) provides for compensation in the event
of partial disability. It provides for compensation of two-thirds of the difference
between the claimants average weekly wages before the injury and the average
weekly wage he is able to earn after the injury.
126. Borden, 100 N.C. App. at 754, 398 S.E.2d at 605.
127. Id. at 755, 398 S.E.2d at 605.
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election of remedies" and should be allowed to rescind the agree-
ment.'2 8 The court of appeals affin-med the Full Commission, find-
ing the plaintiff had not shown one of the required grounds for
recission under section 97-17 as required by Pruitt.129 The
supreme court denied review. 130
In Cockrell v. Evans Lumber Co.13 ' the court of appeals
allowed recission of a clincher agreement on the grounds of
mutual mistake. 132 Mrs. Cockrell was disabled and totally depen-
dent upon her husband when he was killed. 133 She received bene-
fits pursuant to a Form 30 agreement ("Agreement for
Compensation") under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-38.11 The defendant
employer did not know Mrs. Cockrell was totally dependent upon
her husband for support, and Mrs. Cockrell did not know she was
entitled to more benefits under section 97-38 than she received in
the agreement that she signed. 35
The Deputy Commissioner concluded there was a mutual mis-
take on the part of both parties when the Form 30 agreement was
signed.136 The Full Commission reversed, finding no mutual mis-
take.' 37 The court of appeals reversed the Full Commission, find-
ing mutual mistake in the fact that both sides thought the
agreement provided everything Mrs. Cockrell was entitled to
receive under the Act.' 38 Because the defendant employer repre-
sented to Mrs. Cockrell the agreement was a proper one, and since
the mistake benefited the employer, "fundamental equitable prin-
ciples require the mistake not be perpetuated."' 39  Because
128. Id.
129. 328 N.C. 270, 400 S.E.2d 450 (1991); see also supra notes 114-119 and
accompanying text.
130. Id.
131. 103 N.C. App. 359, 407 S.E.2d 248 (1991).
132. Id. at 364, 407 S.E.2d at 250-51.
133. Id. at 360, 407 S.E.2d at 248.
134. Id. at 361, 407 S.E.2d at 249. A Form 30 Agreement is the Industrial
Commission form used for a compensation award for death of a covered
employee.
135. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-38 provides that a dependent of a worker who is
killed is entitled to compensation for a period of four hundred weeks. If the
spouse of the deceased is disabled and unable to support themselves, the survivor
is entitled to compensation for their lifetime or until remarriage. Id.
136. Cockrell, 103 N.C. App. at 362, 407 S.E.2d at 249.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 363, 407 S.E.2d at 250.
139. Id. at 364, 407 S.E.2d. at 251.
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mutual mistake 140 is a grounds for recission under section 97-
17141 the court allowed the agreement to be rescinded. The deci-
sion was not appealed.
Finally, Glenn v. McDonald's 142 concerned a Form 21 compen-
sation agreement, which the parties, signed which the defendant
employer attempted to revoke 143 prior to approval by the Commis-
sion. 144 The Full Commission ordered the approved agreement be
set aside.145 The court of appeals reversed. 146 The court deter-
mined that when approving compensation agreements, the Com-
mission may not look to records, files, or evidence not presented to
it for consideration, and may not base its decision on information
not contained in the record before it. 147 When the Commission
approved the agreement based on the record before it, which did
not contain defense counsel's attempt to revoke the agreement,
such approval was proper. 148 The agreement could not be set
aside because there was no finding the agreement had been
obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, mutual mistake or undue
influence. 149
As these cases illustrate, the North Carolina courts, prior to
Vernon, strictly limited the judicial capacity of the Commission to
set aside agreements. Before Vernon, the only instances in which
courts approved the Commission's decision to release the parties
from an approved agreement were when the grounds for the recis-
sion were clearly within the parameters of section 97-17.
140. Mutual mistake occurs when both parties are under substantially the
same erroneous belief as to the facts. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CoNTRAcTs, § 9.3 (1990).
141. For the text of the statute, see supra note 25.
142. 109 N.C. App. 45, 425 S.E.2d 727 (1993).
143. Id. at 46, 425 S.E.2d at 728. Defense counsel attempted to contact the
executive secretary of the Industrial Commission to communicate the revocation
of consent. Counsel also submitted a letter to the Industrial Commission
revoking consent to the agreement and requesting its return. The Commission
never received the letter nor the note of the telephone conversation. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 45, 425 S.E.2d at 727.
147. Id. at 48, 425 S.E.2d at 730.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 49, 425 S.E.2d at 730. The court also found the defendant could not
deny the truth of the matters asserted in the agreement based on newly acquired
information. Id.
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E. Industrial Commission Review of Compensation Agreements
in Other States
In the great majority of states, the uncontested claims proce-
dure takes the form of an agreement between the parties subject
to the approval of a compensation board.150 In New York, a hear-
ing is necessary in every case. 15 1 At the other end of the spec-
trum, however, some states allow payment to be made directly
from the employer to the employee without any agreement. 152
Some statutes recognize compromises involving concessions by the
injured employee, 153 while others have prohibitions against alter-
ing statutory compensation rights by agreement. 5 4 The majority
rule appears to be that a claimant may not validly agree to take
less compensation than specified by statute. 15 5 The minority posi-
tion is that compensation rights may be compromised by the
employee.' 56 With the decision in Vernon, North Carolina specifi-
cally prohibits such concessions by employees.
IV. ANALYsIs
Although workers' compensation law is the subject of a tre-
mendous amount of litigation, it has been estimated that only one-
tenth to one-fifteenth of all such cases are litigated. 57 The pur-
pose of the creation of schedules, such as N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31,
was to reduce the amount of litigation in this area by having the
legislature decide the appropriate amount of compensation due for
the loss of a major member.15 8 The North Carolina Supreme
Court, with its decision in Vernon, has made an increase in the
amount of litigation in these cases inevitable, and ignored the his-
torical reasoning for the enactment of scheduled injury statutes.
150. 3 LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 82.30 (1994). Such
agreements are allowed in all but the following states: Nevada, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. These states include California, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota and
Wisconsin.
153. Id. at § 82.31. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, California, Illinois,
Louisiana, Montana, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at § 82.32.
156. Id.
157. Id. § 82-10.
158. 1C LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 57.14(c) (1994).
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A. Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders
Under Industrial Commission Rules, compensation agree-
ments merely have to comply with applicable law.159 As a result
of the decision in Vernon, the Commission will have to engage in
some fact finding in every scheduled injury case in which the
plaintiff is unrepresented. 16 0 This is in direct conflict with the
intent of the scheduled injury provisions, which is to prevent liti-
gation of cases involving serious injury and to assure the employee
is guaranteed fair recovery as determined by the legislature. 16
As the Vernon court states, the public enacted the Workers'
Compensation Act for the purpose of avoiding disabled victims of
industry being thrown onto private charity or public relief. 162 The
compensation statute was designed to prevent such destitution. 163
This policy argument ignores the other public policy reasons for
the Act which are limiting the employer's liability, 6 4 reducing the
litigation involved in the recovery system,165 and reducing overall
costs of compensation. 166 Vernon, however, ignores these factors
in favor of greater compensation for individuals. 67 The Vernon
159. Workers' Compensation Rules of the N.C. Indus. Comm'n, Rule 501 (West
1995). Compensation agreements must be completed on Industrial Commission
forms and be accompanied by complete medical records. Id.
160. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 432-33, 444 S.E.2d at 195. The Commission will have
to determine whether the claimant is eligible for compensation under a more
favorable provision, i.e., either section 97-29 or section 97-30, than the one under
which the claimant is pursuing compensation.
161. 1C LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 57.14(c) (1994);
Vernon, 336 N.C. at 438, 444 S.E.2d at 204 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
162. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 432, 444 S.E.2d at 194.
163. Id.
164. Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966); Taylor
v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 57 N.C. App. 643, 292 S.E.2d 277 (1982), modified and
aff'd, 307 N.C. 392, 298 S.E.2d 681 (1983).
165. See Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 295 S.E.2d 458 (1982).
166. Id.
167. By stating the public pays for the compensation system, the court
furthered its public policy argument in Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v.
North Carolina Ind. Comm'n, 336 N.C. 200, 443 S.E.2d 716 (1994). In Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., the court states
[T]he American compensation system does not place the cost on the
"public" as such, but on a particular class of consumers, and thus retains
a relation between the hazardousness of particular industries and the
cost of the system to that industry and consumers of its product. [Thus],
in the United States it is more precise to say that the consumer of a
particular product pays the cost of compensation protection for the
workers engaged in its manufacture.
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decision tips the scales of the Act from a balance between the
employer's and the employee's interests to a scale that is heavily
weighted in favor of employee's rights. Although the public has an
interest in having an injured employee receive maximum benefits
so the employee will not be forced on public assistance, 168 as well
as the public having an interest in a productive workforce, which
should not have to be unnecessarily burdened by paying a claim-
ant more than is considered fair for an injury, the legislature is
the appropriate body to determine the fairness of compensation
for an injury, not the judiciary. 169
In this case, the compensation that Mr. Vernon received was
in compliance with the statute, and thus a fair amount.170 His
employer did not induce him into signing the agreement by
improper means. 17 1 Although the defendant was aware of Dr.
Kelly's note that Mr. Vernon may be totally disabled, the defend-
ant did not believe Mr. Vernon was unable to work. 72 The
defendant compensated Mr. Vernon for what had been medically
determined to be the extent of his disability. 173 If Mr. Vernon had
been represented, it is possible he would have been advised to
accept the defendant's offer of settlement due to problems in prov-
ing his total disability.
B. Settlement Agreements vs. Compensation Agreements
The court in Vernon makes no distinction with regards to
compensation agreements versus settlement and release agree-
ments (also known as "clinchers"). There are several important
differences between the two types of agreements. Settlement
Id. at 222, 443 S.E.2d at 738 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the court opines
that consumers rather than the public pay for injured workers, while in Vernon
the court is interested in keeping the cost away from the public and placing it
upon employers, and ultimately the consumers.
168. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 432, 444 S.E.2d at 194.
169. Id. at 436, 444 S.E.2d at 197 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders, Opinion and Award of Morgan S.
Chapman at 5, I.C. No. 701410, (Sept. 21 1990). The Commissioner found the
agreement was not entered into by reason of fraud, misrepresentation, or
mistake. Id. at 4.
172. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 5, Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, 110
N.C. App. 552, 430 S.E.2d 676 (1993).
173. Vernon, 110 N.C. App. at 554, 430 S.E.2d at 677. The payment pursuant
to the Form 26 agreement compensated Mr. Vernon for the fifteen percent
permanent partial disability to his back as determined by Dr. Kelly. Id.
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agreements are addressed by the legislature in N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 97-17 and compensation agreements are covered in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-82.
Section 97-17 allows voluntary settlement of disputes
between the employer and the employee as to the amount of the
compensation and the time and manner of payment, as long as the
settlement ("clincher") is in accordance with the provisions of the
Act.174 Section 97-82 covers compensation agreements only. It
requires the agreement be on the Industrial Commission forms
and the agreement be accompanied by a full and complete medical
report when it is filed with the Commission. 175 This section does
not contain any provision requiring the agreement to be in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Article. 1 76 The reason for this vari-
ance is that while clincher agreements do release the parties,
compensation agreements do not release the parties from the
jurisdiction of the Commission. 177 There is no need for the Com-
mission to determine whether the employee has received a fair
compensation agreement, beyond compliance with the statute,
particularily since compliance with the statute has a presumption
of fairness. 178
The Vernon court cites the Biddix and Caudill cases as
requiring full investigation and determination by the Industrial
Commission that agreements are fair.'7 9  Both Biddix and
Caudill, however, were concerned with settlement agreements; in
Vernon the compensation agreement was at issue.'80
In Vernon the court states that both clincher agreements and
compensation agreements determine the rights of an employee.' 8 '
174. For the text of the statute, see supra note 25.
175. For the text of the statute, see supra not 97; see also Workers'
Compensation Rules of the N.C. Indus. Comm'n, Rule 501 (West 1995).
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (Supp. 1994).
177. A claimant may apply for more benefits for up to two years after the last
payment is made by the employer if the claimant undergoes a change in
condition. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 97-47.1 (Supp. 1994).
178. See Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, 336 N.C. 425, 436-37, 444 S.E.2d
191, 197 (1994) (Meyer, J., dissenting). See also Hartsell v. Thermoid Co., 249
N.C. 527, 107 S.E.2d 115 (1959).
179. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 431, 444 S.E.2d at 194 (quoting Biddix, 237 N.C. at
663, 75 S.E.2d at 780 and Caudill, 258 N.C. at 106, 128 S.E.2d at 133).
180. The Vernon court does not cite any cases which concern compensation,
rather than settlement agreements. As discussed above, there are significant
distinctions between compensation agreements and settlement agreements. See
supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
181. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 433, 444 S.E.2d at 195,
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This is true only in a somewhat limited sense. When an employee
signs a clincher agreement, he is giving up all of his rights under
the Workers' Compensation Act in return for a specific sum of
money. 1 2 When an employee signs a compensation agreement,
he does not give up his rights under the Act, except in those situa-
tions where he is entitled to recovery under alternative provisions
of the Act.18 3
C. Scheduled Injuries vs. Disability Compensation
Recovery under the scheduled injury provision of the Act may
be had without the employee showing any loss of earnings or earn-
ing capacity.1 8 4 This section was intended to expand, not restrict,
the employee's remedies. 8 5 Because the employee only has to
show that the injury was included on the schedule, the recovery
under this section may over or under-compensate the claimant.8
6
Recovery was allowed in Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Co.18 7
182. The Caudill case is an illustration of how a clincher agreement can
adversely affect a party. Mr. Caudill injured his back in the course of his
employment in September, 1957. He signed a clincher agreement which the
Industrial Commission approved in November, 1958. The employer made
payment of three thousand dollars in return for the full and final settlement of
all claims, past, present, and future, arising out of the accident. A few weeks
later Mr. Caudill experienced complications and returned to the hospital for
surgery; he remained in the hospital for three months. The supreme court held
Mr. Caudill was not entitled to further payments because of the clincher
agreement he had signed. Had Mr. Caudill only signed a compensation
agreement, he would have been able to receive further benefits under section 97-
47 (Change in Condition provision). See also Morgan v. Norwood, 211 N.C. 600,
191 S.E. 345 (1937) (holding settlement agreement final even when claimant
later becomes totally disabled).
183. An employee who signs a compensation agreement may have the award
reviewed for a change in condition under section 97-47 for up to two years from
the date of the last payment of compensation. The employee and employer who
sign a voluntary compensation agreement remain subject to the jurisdiction of
the Industrial Commission. See generally Hogan v. Cone Mills Corp., 315 N.C.
127, 337 S.E.2d 477 (1985).
184. N.C. GEN STAT. § 97-31; Vernon, 336 N.C. at 431, 444 S.E.2d at 194.
185. Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Co., 318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E.2d 336 (1986).
186. This is with regards to the employee's actual loss of wages.
187. 318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E.2d 336 (1986). In Whitley, the court held for the first
time that an employee who was totally disabled as a result of a scheduled injury
could recover for total disability under section 97-29. Id. Before Whitley an
employee who suffered a scheduled injury was limited to recovery under section
97-31, regardless of their impairment of earning capacity.
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under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2918 to redress the problem of under-
compensation. After the Whitley decision, employees may recover
for either their loss of earning capacity or the scheduled injury
provision and may choose whichever provision is more benefi-
cial.' 8 9 Scheduled injury recovery has become a "bonus;" specifi-
cally, the employee is able to recover for the scheduled injury even
if the employee suffers no disability, while being able to recover for
total disability if the employee does in fact suffer economic
damages. 190
After Vernon, the employee must receive compensation under
the most favorable provision of the Act, or the agreement cannot
be approved by the Industrial Commission.' 9 ' Where the
employee may potentially recover under more than one section,
even if it is questionable that the employee will be able to prove
partial or total disability, the Commission will be required to hold
a hearing, or engage in other fact finding, to determine the extent
of the employee's disability.' 92
Under Vernon, a determination of the employee's disability
will be necessary in every case in which a scheduled injury is
involved. 193 As a result, the Commission may require that claim-
ants be represented in order to assure compliance with the Vernon
decision.19 4 This would in turn actually diminish the employee's
recovery because he would be obligated to pay the attorney out of
the proceeds of his recovery, which could lead to the employee
actually receiving less compensation.
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1991) provides for compensation in cases of total
disability.
189. See Gupton v. Builders Transp., 320 N.C. 38, 42, 349 S.E.2d 674, 677
(1987).
190. See Hill v. Hanes Corp., 319 N.C. 167, 353 S.E.2d 392 (1987) (Employee
may be compensated for both a scheduled injury and total incapacity to work
when the total incapacity is caused by a psychiatric disorder brought on by the
scheduled injury.).
191. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 432, 444 S.E.2d at 194 ("We hold, therefore that the
statute requires .. .an employee qualifying for disability compensation under
both sections 97-29 and 97-31 have the benefit of the more favorable remedy.").
192. As Justice Meyer suggests in his dissent, this decision may result in the
Commission requiring that unrepresented plaintiffs in this situation retain legal
counsel. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 437, 444 S.E.2d at 197 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
194. Id.
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D. Workers Compensation Reform Act of 1994
The court in Vernon held the Industrial Commission must
determine, rather than assume, the claimant is knowledgeable
about workers' compensation. 195 The North Carolina General
Assembly recently passed the Workers' Compensation Reform Act
of 1994,196 in which it created an ombudsman program to assist
unrepresented claimants. 197 The purpose of this program is to
enable claimants to protect their rights under the Act. 1 98 The
ombudsman is to meet with and provide information to injured
employees, investigate complaints, and communicate with other
parties on behalf of the employee. 199 The ombudsman may not,
however, represent employees at compensation hearings.
20 0
The General Assembly also revised N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-18 to
institute a direct pay program which allows employers to compen-
sate an injured employee for up to ninety days without admitting
liability and without Commission approval. 20 1 The Industrial
202Commission retains jurisdictions over direct pay claims. The
employer may investigate the claim and deny compensability at
any time during the ninety day period.20 3 This revision should
streamline the system and reduce some of the paperwork
involved.20 a This new system should alleviate some of the
problems created by the Vernon decision in that it allows employ-
ers and employees to come to an agreement regarding compensa-
tion without requiring Commission approval.20 5 If the employer
and the employee cannot come to an agreement, either may file a
request for hearing.20 6
195. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 434, 444 S.E.2d at 196.
196. The Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1994, ch. 679, 1993 N.C. SESS.
LAws (July 5, 1994).
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-79(f) (Supp. 1994).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18 (Supp. 1994). This revision became effective July
5, 1994.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Memorandum from Linwood Jones, Staff Counsel, North Carolina
General Assembly, to Members of the General Assembly and Other Interested
Parties (July 6, 1994).
205. Id.
206. This is essentially the same provision as was in the Act before the
revisions. Id.
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E. The Judicial Capacity of the North Carolina Industrial
Commission
In Vernon, the court focused on the lack of a full investigation
by the Commission in its determination that the Commission had
not fulfilled its duties when it approved the compensation agree-
ment at issue.2 °7 The Commission, as a court of limited jurisdic-
tion, only has those powers specifically granted to it by statute.20
The Commission has developed rules by which it reviews agree-
ments by employers and employees. 20 9  These rules provide for
more complete review of settlement agreements which end the
Commission's jurisdiction,210 than compensation agreements, in
which the Commission's jurisdiction is continued.211 This is a log-
ical distinction, because once the Commission's jurisdiction has
ended, it cannot assist the employee in recovering compensation
for his injuries.2 12
With the decision in Vernon, the court has judicially
expanded the powers of the Industrial Commission. The Commis-
sion, after Vernon, may set aside approved agreements which
comply with the statute, if it determines such agreements are
"unfair" to the employee.21 3 The standard of fairness the Commis-
sion should use, however, is not fully explained by the court. This
decision does away with the different standards of review for
clincher and settlement agreements and institutes a single stan-
dard of review for all agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
In Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held the Industrial Commission must conduct a
full investigation to determine the fairness of compensation agree-
ments. The standard of fairness the court desires, however, is
unclear. Prior to this decision, such agreements only had to com-
207. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 432, 444 S.E.2d at 195.
208. Biddix, 237 N.C. at 662-63, 75 S.E.2d at 780.
209. N.C. GEN STAT. § 97-80(a) (Supp. 1994) gives the Commission the power
to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act.
210. Workers' Compensation Rules of the N.C. Indus. Comm'n, Rule 502 (West
1995) (Compromise Settlement Agreements).
211. Workers' Compensation Rules of the N.C. Indus. Comm'n, Rule 501 (West
1995) (Agreements for Payment of Compensation).
212. Biddix, 237 N.C. at 662, 75 S.E.2d at 780.
213. Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe Builders, 336 N.C. 425, 434, 444 S.E.2d 200,
208 (1986).
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ply with the workers' compensation statute before the Industrial
Commission would give approval. Presumably, the court in
Vernon is requiring the Commission go beyond finding the agree-
ment complies with the statute, and is now requiring the Commis-
sion assure the injured employee receives maximum possible
benefits.
This new requirement by the North Carolina Supreme Court
may be satisfied by the General Assembly's creation of an
ombudsman program in the Workers' Compensation Reform Act
of 1994. If the ombudsman program does not meet the "investiga-
tion" and "fairness" requirements announced in Vernon, however,
it is unclear what the results might be. Lower courts could allow
approved agreements to be set aside when unrepresented claim-
ants assert they are unaware of the legal consequences of the
agreements. Furthermore, the Industrial Commission may have
to institute a requirement that a claimant retain counsel before a
settlement agreement is approved.
The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act was passed
as a compromise between the interests of employers and employ-
ees. With Vernon decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court
takes another step moving the balance of those interest in favor of
employees, and ignoring the legitimate interests and concerns of
employers.
Isabel B. Loytty
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